large number of voters in the high-risk region want a large federal program because it redistributes in their favor. Against this, a majority of the voters in the low-risk region would like to trim the program down, but under empirically plausible assumptions about the distribution of income risks, the coalition of high-risk voters prevails.
Thus the paper points to an important difference between two alternative federal fiscal constitutions. Interregional transfers can be determined by a federation-wide vote over a centralized social insurance system or by bargaining over intergovernment transfers. When the regions are asymmetric, the former system leads to a larger fiscal program.
These results suggest a number of practical implications for institution design in real-world federations or confederations. Consider, for instance, the ongoing debate on "political union" in Europe. One of the central issues is whether and how to enhance the role of the European Parliament in policy formation. An enhanced role really requires that European Parliament representatives form coalitions across national borders. But giving the European Parliament more authority or more right of initiative over intergovernmental relations and agreements is unlikely to bring this about. The results of Sections IV and V suggest that cross-border coalitions are more likely to arise if the European Parliament has jurisdiction on policies that directly affect individual citizens. That would entail quite a change in the mode of operations of the European Union. In particular, there is a fear that this kind of centralization might lead to a larger-size government. The results of Section V suggest that this fear is well grounded.
The results of this paper also carry implications for single countries that seek more decentralization, such as Italy and Belgium. Italy and, to a lesser extent, Belgium display hugh asymmetries in average per capita income across regions. Politically feasible decentralization has to be accompanied by a system of regional redistribution; otherwise the poorest regions would stand to lose too much. What would be the properties of alternative systems of regional redistribution? Moreover, both countries are also trying to reduce their large budget deficit. Should decentralization wait until the fiscal adjustment has been completed? And if not, which redistribution system is more likely to lead to smaller equilibrium expenditures? The results of Sections IV and V shed some light on these difficult questions. They suggest that decentralization could make the fiscal adjustment politically easier to carry out because it reduces equilibrium redistribution, and hence it should not be postponed. But a mere transfer of authority to lowerlevel governments may not be sufficient unless it is accompanied by deeper constitutional change. Horizontal redistribution by means of intergovernment transfers requires that decisions over these transfers FEDERAL FISCAL CONSTITUTIONS 983 be delegated to representatives of regional governments. A nationwide vote would lead to sharp regional divisions and would not protect the smaller regions. Hence, the creation of an upper house of regional representatives, like that in most federal structures, may be an essential part of fiscal decentralization.
There is, of course, a large literature on fiscal federalism, a great part of which studies mobility of voters or tax bases. This paper abstracts from mobility, not because we think that it is important, but because it has already received a great deal of attention (see, e.g., Boadway 1982; Wilson 1987; Epple and Romer 1991). There would be more than one way to add an individual choice of location to the model of this paper. Individuals could move ex ante, before knowing their pretax income. Or they could move ex post, once their income is known. In both cases, the mobility choice would add an incentive constraint on the local and the federal governments. It could also create new spillover effects and thus modify the interregional transfers chosen in the political equilibrium.
A more recent group of contributions takes an approach similar to the approach in this paper, focusing on the political consequences of instrument assignment to different levels of government and of the procedures for collective choice.' The closest antecedent is Persson and Tabellini (1996) , which uses a similar model to analyze the normative problem of how to design a federal constitution so as to resolve the trade-off between interregional risk sharing and moral hazard of local governments. Casella (1992) studies the economic and political integration of two asymmetric regions, each populated by heterogeneous individuals, but focuses on public-goods provision. Perotti (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) investigate how centralization of government programs changes their equilibrium size, but neither paper studies social insurance or risk sharing between regions. Finally, Buchanan and Faith (1987) and Bolton and Roland (1995) address issues of regional redistribution in purely redistributive models, where the threat of secession imposes a binding constraint on federal policy.
II. The Model

A. The Basic Model
Consider a federation that includes two regions of equal population size. We describe the home region first. Individuals are risk averse; they all have the same preferences for consumption, captured by a concave utility function U( ). They live only one period and are indexed by i. Their income is one with probability pi and zero with probability 1 -pt. Individuals with income are called "employed"; those with no income, "unemployed." Individual income is not verifiable, which means that individuals cannot self-insure through the market. This strong assumption has two advantages. First, it provides a potential role for a public policy of risk sharing. Second, it enables us to compare different policy environments on the basis of individual welfare, while retaining simplicity and tractability.2 Individuals are exposed to aggregate as well as idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, individuals differ in their idiosyncratic risk: some individuals are exposed to more risk than others. This assumption makes the political equilibria nontrivial, in the sense that individuals differ over their preferred policy.
Specifically, we assume that p' = pirT, where ofr is distributed in the population according to a known distribution G(riT). Furthermore, we make the following assumption. By the law of large numbers, p is the fraction of employed individuals in the population, and hence p also denotes average income. The assumption that mrt is skewed to the left is realistic. It implies that the unemployment risk is concentrated in a relatively small number of individuals in the population.
To allow for aggregate risk in a simple way, we assume that p can take only two values: p = y with probability Q and p = IB with probability 1 -Q, with -y > ,3. Hence, -y denotes the good aggregate state in the home region, and P1 denotes the bad aggregate state. We assume away all aggregate risk in the federation by taking the regional shocks to be perfectly negatively correlated. So the probability of being in the good aggregate state in the foreign region is Q * = 1 -Q. But in all other respects the two regions are symmetric.
In particular, the two regions have the same values for -y and 13, the same preferences, and the same distribution G(v) of individual risks. Thus aggregate output is always equal to -y + P3 and is distributed 2 It would be more convincing to base the market failure in private insurance on adverse selection (p' in the model unobservable) or moral hazard (some private action affecting the probability pz unobservable), rather than on prohibitively costly state verification. The major argument for the present formulation is convenience: with imperfect private insurance, we would have to keep track of an endogenous private contract equilibrium and its interaction with fiscal policy across different federal constitutions.
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according to p = -y and p* = 13 with probability Q; p = 13 and p* = -y with probability 1 -Q, with an asterisk denoting the foreign region.
The results of the paper also hold if average regional incomes are imperfectly negatively correlated, although their derivation is more complicated.3
In this setup there is clearly scope for risk sharing across regions. In our stark formulation of the model, there are no private markets that can serve this function. The formulation is motivated by plausibility and simplicity. It is a well-known fact that private international risk sharing is far from perfect: domestic portfolios have a much greater share of domestic securities, and domestic consumption shows a far greater correlation with income than standard models of risk sharing suggest. Our formulation should therefore be viewed as a simplified version of a more complicated model, where some, but not all, domestic risk could be diversified away via private markets. Note, however, that private contingent contracts among residents of different regions could undo some of the effects of government policies. In a simple economy like this, with no distorting taxation, unrestricted private financial arrangements are likely to result in neutrality of public financial policies.
Policies are chosen before the state of nature is revealed. There are two policies: one regional, the other federal. Throughout the paper the regional policy always consists of a "social insurance" program, chosen under majority rule by the residents of each region. This regional policy is contingent on the state of nature and redistributes among individuals of that region. Redistribution is achieved by means of an output tax (subsidy), accompanied by a lump-sum transfer (tax) to every individual, and thus it has only limited informational requirements. In particular, it is not necessary for the regional government to observe nonverifiable individual income. In this way, the regional government chooses an allocation of consumption between the employed and unemployed individuals, c(p, p*) and b(p, p*), re-'We have considered the case in which p = y with probability Q and p = 3 with probability 1 -Q, and likewise p* = -y with probability Q* and p* = 3 with probability 1 -Q*, for arbitrary probabilities Q and Q*. Regional policy is always set under direct democracy, that is, by a vote of the regional residents. In Sections III and IV, strategic aspects play a role, and it matters whether individuals vote on the output tax rate or on the size of lump-sum transfers. Throughout the paper we assume that they vote on the latter. That is, the regional policy fixes the (state-contingent) "replacement rate" of the local unemployment insurance system, and the (state-contingent) tax rate is residually determined by the budget constraint. This assumption resembles how policies are set in the real world. We discuss how the results would be affected by alternative assumptions below (see nn. 7 and 9).
In the paper we consider alternative federal policy instruments. Their economic role is to share risks and possibly to redistribute income across the two regions. We investigate how the political equilibria differ under alternative policy instruments and under alternative procedures for choosing them. To preserve comparability of these alternative instrument assignments, we assume the same timing of events throughout the paper: the regional and the federal governments always move simultaneously. Thus the federal fiscal constitutions considered in this paper differ in terms of instrument assignments to government levels (i.e., of centralization of policies) and in terms of collective choice procedures (voting vs. bargaining), but not in terms of commitment capacity. The role of federal precommitment is studied in Persson and Tabellini (1996) , albeit in a somewhat different context. Whatever the federal policy instrument, the resource constraint of the home region can be written as pc(p,p*) + (1 -p)b(p,p*) = p-(P )+ K.
(1)
The left-hand side denotes the consumption of the employed and unemployed; there are p employed and 1 -p unemployed. The right-hand side denotes average per capita income, p, plus the transLer from the other region. Thus T iS the proportion oi the difference in regional income that is transferred across the two regions and is determined by the federal policy. And K is a lump-sum transfer, unrelated to the state of the world, that can be thought of as an insurance premium. Together, these two federal instruments, v and K, can achieve any state-contingent allocation of income across the two regions. The resource constraint for the foreign region is analogous to (1), except that the terms in T and K have the reverse sign.
Even though the regional resource constraint is given by (1) irrespective of the federal policy regime, the interpretation of v and K depends on the exact nature of the federal policy. In Section III, we study interregional risk sharing via a system of unrestricted intergovernment transfers. In Section IV, the intergovernment transfer scheme is operated under the constraint K = 0. In Section V, finally, we study a system of federal social insurance. In that system, equation (1) with K = 0 still holds, but T represents an output tax that finances transfers to individuals rather than to governments.
In other words, different federal arrangements for sharing regional risks lead to the same form of regional resource constraint. Given the simplicity of the underlying model, these arrangements are thus economically equivalent, in the sense that they can implement the same allocations. This equivalence is only superficial, however: it neglects the difference in the incentive constraints perceived by the voters or federal policy makers in different political regimes. As the paper will show, different procedures for collectively choosing the federal policy instruments lead to very different equilibrium allocations.
B. Regional Social Insurance
It is easy to characterize the regional social insurance policies chosen in a political equilibrium (see also Persson and Tabellini 1996) . The voters' preferences-their expected utility function-in the home region can be written as
where V'(p, p*) is the expected utility of the ith voter in state (p, p*):
The only source of heterogeneity among voters is the parameter fi that enters linearly in the voters' preferences. It is then easy to show that the median-voter result applies despite the multidimensional issue space (see Persson and Tabellini 1996 where a subscript denotes a derivative. To pin down both c and b, we of course also need the budget constraint (1). Since by assumption pm ? p, the equilibrium policy satisfies c > b for all p, p*. That is, a majority of the voters prefer incomplete risk sharing across individuals, even though full risk sharing through the government would be feasible at no loss of efficiency. The reason is that individual risk is concentrated in a few "high-risk" subjects.5 More generally, the smaller pm (i.e., the closer irm is to one), the more generous equilibrium social insurance is. The equilibrium social insurance in the foreign region is completely analogous. As will be shown in the subsequent sections, changing the federal fiscal constitution does not change the domestic optimization problem faced by the regional median voters in any relevant respects. The reason is that under the assumed simultaneous timing, the regional policy maker always takes the federal policy as given. Throughout the paper, thus, equation (4) continues to hold and characterize the regional social insurance and the allocation of consumption between employed and unemployed individuals in both regions.
III. State-Contingent Intergovernment Transfers
The simplest risk-sharing arrangement between the two regions is a direct state-contingent transfer from one regional government to the other. As explained in the previous section, this corresponds to a combination of federal instruments T and K on the right-hand side of equation (1 
where Xi is an individual-specific weight and 8 is the relative weight on the foreign region; we have relied on the assumption that the regional distribution of rr is the same in the two regions. Naturally, efficiency here is subject to the constraint of a given regional social insurance policy. Equation (6a) characterizes the allocation of consumption across states in both regions. Clearly, it does not depend on the individual weights XA. Since there is no aggregate risk in the federation as a whole, the resource constraint for the whole federation is satisfied only if both sides of (6a) are equal to one, that is, only if there is full consumption smoothing across the two states of the world within each region. Equation (6b) describes the allocation of consumption across regions. Clearly, the home and foreign regions consume in equal amounts only if 8 = 1, and more generally, the home region consumes more relative to the foreign one the smaller the relative weight B. Hence K is set as stated in the proposition, and the function K() is defined implicitly by (6). Q.E.D. Proposition 1 is quite intuitive. Since there is no aggregate risk in the federation and given that, at the margin, intergovernment transfers affect consumption of only the employed, every federal voter agrees that it is optimal to equalize consumption across aggregate states.7 There is, however, a conflict over the interregional allocation of resources. Since both regions have the same social insurance policy, determined by the same median voter Sm, every individual in the home region evaluates this regional conflict in the same way, and likewise in the foreign region. Hence, the efficient allocation of consumption across regions reflects only the relative weight parameter 8, and not the individual weights. Finally, it is important to note that efficient policies do not depend on Q and Q*. Given 8, asymmetries in the stochastic distribution of output across the two regions are not reflected in the efficient federal policy. 7 Unanimity thus depends on the assumption that the regional vote fixes the replacement rate. If the regional vote is instead on the tax rate and the replacement rate is residually determined, then the intergovernment transfer is allocated among both employed and unemployed individuals. Individuals with different employment risks would then generally evaluate the federal policy differently, and unanimity would be lost. For the regional median voters, this issue does not arise. Since they are really in charge of the regional policy, they agree that r = i' is optimal, irrespective of which instrument is being voted on at the regional level. Combining propositions 1 and 2, we obtain a very intuitive result. In a Nash bargaining equilibrium, the two regions achieve full insurance. But the high-risk (low-Q) region pays a lump-sum transfer K(8) to the low-risk region, as compensation for its higher risk. The larger the asymmetry between the two regions, the larger this compensation is.
Thus a Nash bargaining equilibrium has the same qualitative feature as an actuarially fair insurance system, in that the high-risk country pays a premium to the low-risk country. An actuarially fair system would set K SO that the expected value of the transfers across regions is zero. This would imply that K = sS(y -3)(Q -1/2)/2. But the premium under Nash bargaining can be larger or smaller than the actuarially fair premium, depending on the curvature of the utility function. The reason is that the bargaining power of a region depends on its welfare in autarky versus its welfare when insured. And that relation depends on the degree of risk aversion of the regional median voters at different levels of income.
C. Voting
What would happen if the intergovernment transfers were instead chosen by a federation-wide vote? Without any formal argument, it is clear that this would be a bad mechanism for selecting the intergovernment transfers. The reason is that the policy preferences of all voters in the home region are in stark conflict with the policy preferences of all voters in the foreign region. Deciding noncooperatively on the desired transfers, every home-region voter wants to drive K to its uppermost corner, and every foreign-region voter wants to drive FEDERAL FISCAL CONSTITUTIONS 993 K to its lowermost corner. Some restrictions on the redistributive component in the risk-sharing scheme, or some modifications of the principle of simple majority, are thus necessary to make a voting mechanism viable without one region ending up completely exploited by the other.
IV. Simple Intergovernment Transfers
Suppose that the intergovernment transfer scheme is indeed restricted so that only some interregional income allocations across states of the world can be implemented. Actual intergovernment transfer schemes in existing federations, such as Canada and Germany, do in fact rely on preset formulas, which allocate equalization grants across regions according to the relation between regional and average tax bases or incomes.
In our model, a natural restriction is to set the lump-sum component K in the regional resource constraints equal to zero. With this constraint, the output tax and transfer to each regional government are state-independent and equal across regions. As a result, risk sharing and redistribution become intertwined and cannot be separated as in the previous section. This section shows that such asymmetries lead to sharp interregional disagreement over the extent of risk sharing. Moreover, the equilibrium with bargaining typically exhibits incomplete insurance, the more so the greater the asymmetries. We maintain the assumption that the regional social insurance policy is determined by a vote over the replacement rate and that the regional vote occurs simultaneously with the determination of the federal policy.
A. Voting
To start, suppose that the transfer is chosen under majority rule in a federation-wide vote. Thus all voters simultaneously cast two ballots: one over the federal policy, the other over the regional policy. The federal vote determines the intergovernment transfer rate v; here citizens of both regions participate in the vote. The regional vote determines the replacement rate; here only regional residents participate in the vote. The regional voting equilibrium is as in the previous sections: a replacement rate that allocates consumption of employed and unemployed individuals according to (4) in each region, given the equilibrium federal policy. This policy is defined as follows. If not, the discrepancy between their desired solutions is larger, the larger the distance IQ -Q*I Moreover, the left-hand sides of (11) and (13) are both decreasing in Q. Hence, a higher value of Q leads to a preference for a lower T in the home region but a higher 7 in the foreign region. Q.E.D.
In summary, if Q > Q*, the restricted intergovernment transfer scheme makes the home region more likely to pay a transfer to the other region. Hence, it wants less risk sharing. Exactly the reverse is true for the foreign region. What is perhaps more striking is the unanimity within each region, even though the voters are heterogeneous. This suggests that voting in the federation is still a very poor procedure for choosing the size of direct intergovernment transfers. The nature of the policy instrument, even when restricted, exacer-bates interregional conflict, since it emphasizes the redistributive implications of asymmetries between regions. No coalition of voters is formed across borders, and the largest region wins. A more natural way of choosing the size of intergovernment transfers is instead bargaining between representatives of each region.
B. Nash Bargaining
Suppose that the size of the restricted intergovernment transfer is determined by a bargaining process. We assume, as in Section III, that the bargaining takes place between the median voters in the two regions. DEFINITION 2. A political equilibrium with restricted intergovernment transfers under bargaining is given by the Nash bargaining solution for the home and foreign median voters, with autarky as the threat point.
Let TN be the Nash equilibrium value of T. We then have the following result. 
Q*l
The proof is contained in Appendix A. Proposition 4 relies on the same kind of intuition as proposition 3. The region with a more favorable distribution of output has more bargaining power because autarky is less harmful for it. But here the bargaining occurs over the extent of insurance, 7, not over the insurance premium K. When the risk-sharing scheme is restricted to the parameter 7, the low-risk region wants a smaller value because, on average, it ends up paying rather than receiving. Therefore, the more different the regions, the smaller the Nash bargaining equilibrium level of risk sharing. Thus the trade-off between risk sharing and redistribution plays a key role in the argument.
V. Federal Social Insurance
An alternative risk-sharing arrangement is to centralize social insurance at the level of the federal government. A centralized social insurance system indirectly redistributes across regions by collecting more taxes in the rich region than in the poor. In existing federations, centralized fiscal programs typically operate under the constraint that individuals and firms in different regions be treated equally. A simple way to capture this restriction in our model is to assume that the federal social insurance scheme is non-state-contingent.10 997 This restriction creates a trade-off between risk sharing and redistribution similar to the one in the previous section. In fact, federal social insurance under this restriction turns out to be economically equivalent to the previous system with restricted intergovernment transfers, in the sense that any allocation reached with intergovernment transfers can also be reproduced by federal social insurance. The coalitions of voters that are formed under the two systems are very different, however, and hence the equilibrium allocations also differ. We now turn to an investigation of the nature of these political differences.
Individual income and preferences are the same as in the previous sections. Now, however, both the local and federal governments levy output taxes to finance lump-sum payments to individuals. Thus there is social insurance at both levels of government. As explained above, we assume that the federal tax rate is not state-contingent and the federal transfer to individuals is residually determined. To facilitate comparisons with our previous results, the local tax rate, on the other hand, is state-contingent, and so is the associated local replacement rate. We continue to assume simultaneous policy making. There are no intergovernment transfers.
It is easy to show that under these assumptions, consumption of the employed and unemployed individuals in the home region can be written as where t and T denote the local and federal tax rates, respectively, and p (1y + P)/2 is average income in the federation. The foreign region is analogous in all respects. Besides (14), both levels of government are subject to constraints on t and X that correspond to nonnegativity constraints on c and b. Throughout the section we consider only interior equilibria in which these corner constraints are not binding. This amounts to assuming that the U( ) function has sufficient concavity as consumption approaches zero.
What is the equilibrium in this setup? That turns out to depend on the procedure for choosing the federal policy.
payments would treat individuals in the two regions differently, in the sense that their expected net payments would depend on the probability of a bad shock in the region in which they reside, even though the state-dependent tax rates would be equal across regions. As in Sec. III, two policy instruments would be enough to span the twodimensional state space and hence effectively separate risk sharing from redistribution. However, in a less stylized world, spanning by fully state-contingent policy instruments would be much harder to achieve, particularly under a constraint of equal treatment across regions.
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A. Nash Bargaining
With Nash bargaining the nature of the federal policy instrument is irrelevant. PROPOSITION 5. If the federal tax rate is set under Nash bargaining by the two regional medians, the equilibrium with federal social insurance is identical to the equilibrium with intergovernment transfers described in proposition 4.
The proof is contained in the discussion above. Combining the two equations in (14), we obtain the resource constraint (1) with K = 0, where r now denotes the same federal tax rate that enters (14). That is, the regions' resource constraints are identical to what they are in a system with intergovernment transfers. As the regional medians not only have the same threat points but also perceive exactly the same constraints as with a system of intergovernment transfers, the Nash bargaining outcome is the same. Q.E.D.
B. Voting
The equivalence is broken if federal social insurance is instead chosen by a majority vote. The reason is that the equilibrium outcome now depends on the voters' coalitions. And with federal social insurance, voters form different coalitions than under a system of intergovernment transfers. To address this issue we investigate a political equilibrium, defined as follows.
DEFINITION
3. Federal and regional policies are chosen simultaneously under majority rule. Equilibrium federal policy is a value of 7r preferred to any other by a majority of federal voters, given the equilibrium regional tax rate (or replacement rate) in both regions.
The equilibrium regional policy is analogously defined, except that the quorum is now made up of residents of that region only. Note that here it does not matter whether the regional vote is taken over the tax rates or the replacement rates. The reason is that the federal policy now deals directly with the individuals. Therefore, at the margin, its allocative effects do not depend on the local policy setting.
Consider domestic voter 7rf. Her preferred federal tax rate is obtained by taking the first-order condition of her expected utility function with respect to 7, subject to (14) and given the regional tax rate t: the greater the amount of redistribution desired by a given federal voter. This explains property i: as T rises, to find a voter wTf who finds the higher T optimal, we need to move toward a higher-risk (lower-u4f) voter. Property ii is illustrated for the home region in figure 1, which draws the locus of points wTf and Q for which rs is optimal. This locus is downward sloping because a drop in regional risk (a higher Q) induces a preference for a lower federal tax T. To find a voter who still finds Ts optimal, we must move to a higher-risk (lower--rrf) individual. The foreign region has the same curve except that the horizontal axis is labeled 1 -Q = Q*. The convexity of the locus means that the regional risk component becomes less important, relative to the individual risk component, as Q rises. By property i, all points above the downward-sloping curve correspond to voters (in either region) who would prefer a lower federal tax rate, whereas all points below it correspond to voters who would like a higher federal tax rate. Finally, property iii says that this curve passes through the point (u'm, '/2), point S in figure 1.
We can now define the political equilibrium more precisely. Since preferences are single-peaked (see App. B), the equilibrium has the usual median-voter property. The equilibrium is a tax rate TV that is preferred by the median voters in the federation. Since G( ) denotes the distribution function of the individual risk parameter within each region, the equilibrium is a value of TV that satisfies the following equation:
G(H(TV, Q; Tm)) + G(HTrV, 1 -Q; Tm)) = 1.
(17)
The first term on the left-hand side of (17) measures the size of the coalition of home voters who want taxes higher than TV (i.e., the voters with irT s fl(rV, Q; irm)). The second term measures the size of the corresponding foreign coalition. For TV to be an equilibrium, these two coalitions must make up half of the electorate (recall that each region has the same population, unity).
Consider first the case in which the two regions are identical. Lemma 1 immediately implies the following proposition. high-risk voters in the home region who were earlier prepared to vote for a higher tax rate. But one also gains G(,rm + A*(Q)) -1/2 low-risk voters in the foreign region who are now prepared to vote for a higher tax rate than before. If the distribution G were symmetric, the fact that A*(Q) 2-A(Q) would mean that the coalition prepared to support a higher tax rate than TS is now larger, which would naturally imply T7 > TS. But in assumption 1 we instead assumed that the distribution was skewed to the left. That assumption can be reformulated as lemma 3. Thus the skewness assumption implies that one in fact gains more voters in the foreign region than one loses in the home region, even when A(Q) = A*(Q). This only reinforces the pressure for a higher federal tax rate.
We can put the pieces above together formally. Lemmas 2 and 3 together imply that the right-hand side of equation (17) The conclusion is thus that T7 is higher than Ts for two reasons. The distribution of voters is denser to the right than to the left of rm (cf. lemma 3). And to find a voter who favors TS when Q > Q*, one has to move further to the right in the foreign (high-risk) region than to the left in the home (low-risk) region (cf. lemma 2). Taken together, these properties increase the size of the coalition that supports a higher federal tax rate. In summary, regional asymmetries have opposite effects on the equilibria in a federal social insurance system under voting and under bargaining. Under bargaining, regional asymmetries reduce the equilibrium value of v. Under voting, these asymmetries instead increase the equilibrium value of T. The reason is that under bargaining the balance of power shifts toward the low-risk region, which weakens the demands for redistribution; the opposite happens under voting.
C. Participation Constraints
There is another interesting difference between voting and bargaining. Bargaining clearly guarantees that the participation constraint of both regions is satisfied. Since the bargaining outcome, by definition, is better than autarky for the pivotal voter, it follows that a referendum in each region would validate the federal arrangement.'2 Voting, as we have dealt with it above, has no such guarantee. For large enough asymmetries between the regions, the median voter in the low-risk region may actually be better off in autarky, so that the federal arrangement would be rejected in a local ratification vote. Let us therefore briefly discuss how a subsequent ratification vote could alter the political equilibrium. Specifically, consider the following simple two-stage extension of the previous policy game. In the first stage, federal and regional policies are chosen simultaneously under majority rule. In the second stage, the federal tax rate is subject to a simultaneous ratification vote in each region with a simple majority requirement. Rejection in any of the two regions repeals the federal arrangement. We assume that the regional policy cannot be reset, in the event of rejection. A to any alternative T in the acceptance interval 0 ' T ' TA. Thus whoever supported a higher tax rate than TV in the unrestricted vote will now vote for TA against any alternative in the acceptance interval.
Finally, consider the high-risk region. There a majority of the voters have an unrestricted bliss point for 7 higher than TV. By monotonicity, they would all prefer 7A to zero. Thus again every voter who supported federal tax rates above TV in the unrestricted vote of the previous model will vote for 7A in the first-stage vote of the present model. It follows that a majority of voters in the federation prefer 7A to any implementable alternative. Q.E.D.
With large differences in regional risks, the threat of secession thus imposes an upper bound on the extent of overinsurance in this simple model. (Note that in this model, in contrast to Bolton and Roland [1995] , secession is not an equilibrium outcome.) This mechanism is also likely to survive in more realistic models; they would allow for resetting regional policy after a negative ratification vote, or for voting on regional representatives, something that would open the door for strategic voting or strategic delegation in the first-stage regional 13 This means that some voters with rf > am will have non-single-peaked preferences in the first-stage federal vote over r. More precisely, these voters prefer Xr > TA to Xr < TA, despite r < TA being closer to their bliss point, because they correctly anticipate that T > rA will be rejected in the second-stage vote, including the autarky outcome r = 0. As we shall see below, however, this does not produce any nonexistence problems.
FEDERAL FISCAL CONSTITUTIONS 1005
vote. An interesting question is whether the simple majority, equal representation voting mechanism that we have studied could be modified to eliminate the threat of secession or whether it would be necessary to alter the assignment of policy instruments.
VI. Conclusion
Realistic restrictions on the policy instruments for interregional risk sharing introduce a trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. How the conflicting interests of the regions are resolved depends critically on the mechanism for collective choice. As we have seen, the equilibrium solutions under bargaining and voting are pushed in opposite directions relative to an efficient unrestricted risk-sharing scheme. The model predicts that federal social insurance schemes decided on by voting will oversupply regional risk sharing, whereas federal intergovernment transfer schemes decided on by bargaining will undersupply it.
The key to this result is that a system of intergovernment transfers redistributes income along one dimension only: across regions. Thus the rich region and the poor have opposite interests. If autarky is the threat point, the rich region has more bargaining power and the equilibrium is closer to its preferred outcome. A centralized social insurance system, on the other hand, redistributes along two dimensions simultaneously: geographically and across rich and poor individuals within each region. The resulting geographical redistribution is less transparent, and the voters' coalitions cross the regional borders. Under the assumption that unemployment risk is concentrated in a minority of the population within each region, the voting equilibrium is closer to the outcome preferred by a majority of the residents in the poor region.
Even though the paper has focused on the voters' perceived tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution, the same insight could apply to other public choices in a federation. Consider, for instance, the provision of a federal public good valued by both regions. The public good could be financed directly by means of federal income taxes on the citizens of both regions or by transfers from the regional governments. Moreover, the quantity of the public good could be chosen by a federation-wide vote or by bargaining. A trade-off similar to that of this paper is likely to arise. With centralized public good provision and financing, voters' coalitions are likely to be formed on the basis of income, not residence. If, on the other hand, the public good is financed through intergovernment transfers, then the regional dimension will be more likely to dominate. The properties of the decentralized and centralized equilibria are then likely to depend 1oo6 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY on the same fundamental variables identified in this paper, namely, the relative bargaining power of the regional governments and the shape of the voters' distribution within each region, respectively.
More generally, the public finance arrangement determines whether the policy redistributes along one dimension or many. Under some collective choice mechanisms, this distinction matters. Hence, policies that appear to be economically equivalent, in the sense that they can implement exactly the same allocations, nevertheless result in different political equilibria.'4
The positive results of this paper could be confronted with data on the variation of fiscal programs across existing federations and time. In particular, many modern federations have evolved from looser confederations to stronger national systems. At an early stage, the federal institutions mainly provided a forum for state negotiations. But later on, the federal government came to represent all voters to a much greater extent. This evolution has generally coincided with a tendency toward fiscal centralization. It would be interesting, but difficult, to study the comparative performance of these federations over time in the light of the positive results summarized above.
Does the paper yield normative conclusions for federal constitutional choices? If so, they are certainly difficult to draw, because neither the decentralized nor the centralized arrangements produce efficient outcomes. As explained in Section III, efficiency requires sufficient instruments to separate risk sharing and redistribution. Nevertheless, some normative trade-offs are apparent. An attractive feature of a centralized social insurance system is that it fosters integration, provided that the participation constraint is met. A system of intergovernment transfers, on the other hand, makes the redistribution more transparent and thus may exacerbate regional conflict. For countries that seek to reduce the size of government, however, a decentralized arrangement may be more attractive because it leads to less equilibrium redistribution. Our preliminary results on participation constraints can perhaps be taken as suggesting that constitutional checks and balances, say in the form of bicameral legislatures, may play a similar part in a centralized system. Can we say something about the positive question of which constitution is more likely to be chosen? When citizens evaluate alternative arrangements, they compare equilibrium outcomes. Thus, in the model of this paper, the main difference among constitutions concerns the equilibrium amount of interregional transfers. The reason '4 Tabellini (1991) has shown that a similar idea applies to the comparison of public debt and social security. Both instruments redistribute across generations. Moreover, they can be economically equivalent in the sense described above. But the intragenerational redistribution induced by debt and social security is generally different, and this matters for the voting equilibria.
is that the equilibrium allocation of income between employed and unemployed individuals within each region does not depend on the federal arrangement. As a consequence, residents in the rich region prefer intergovernment transfers with bargaining, whereas residents in the poor region prefer voting on a centralized social insurance. The reason is that the size of interregional transfers is larger under the second arrangement than under the first. How this conflict is resolved depends on the procedure for constitutional choice.
